Niels Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity in order to give a general account of quantum mechanics, however he stressed that the idea of complementarity is related to the general difficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object. Earlier, we have introduced a development of the concept of complementarity which constitutes a new approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that this development allows a better understanding of some of the paradigmatic interpretational problems of quantum theory.
The Problem of Understanding Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics was born in one of the most turbulent periods in the history of western philosophy. At the end on the XIX century the classical conception of the world was threatened, critics started to spread out from different disciplines: philosophy, mathematics, literature, music, etc. In physics, right at the beginning of the XX century, a new theory accomplished the unthinkable and escaped the limits of classical physical reality. Quantum mechanics raised from the depths of the Tartarus, a dark land of thought where the lightnings of Zeus had never arrived. Since then, and more than one century later, the problem to which quantum mechanics confronts us remains untouched. The famous statement of Richard Feynman ([22] , p.129) gives an idea of the state of affairs: "I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics."
The epistemological constraints imposed by the way of interacting with atoms opened the doors of a new world. The way in which atomic phenomena was acquired was formally expressed by the quantum postulate which, according to Bohr, expresses the most important character of the atomic theory:
"The quantum theory is characterized by the acknowledgement of a fundamental limitation in the classical physical ideas when applied to atomic phenomena. [...] its essence may be expressed in the so called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck's quantum of action." N. Bohr (quoted from [56] , p.88)
Werner Heisenberg was able to extend this critic into a consistent formalism which represented the new epistemological constrains imposed by experiencing with atoms. As expressed by Bohr:
"As is known, the new development was connected in a fundamental paper by Heisenberg, where he succeeded in emancipating himself completely from the classical concept of motion by replacing from the very start the ordinary kinematical and mechanical quantities by symbols which refer directly to the individual processes demanded by the quantum postulate." N. Bohr (quoted from [56] , p.105, emphasis added)
It was the critic to the classical concepts which guided Heisenberg into the principle of indetermination of quantum observables. As Heisenberg recalls in his autobiography Das teil und der ganze [29] , it was Albert Einstein himself who inspired him by expressing the idea that: "it is only the theory which decides what can be observed." In this way the theory appears as the condition of possibility to access certain phenomena. Quantum mechanics, escaping from the presuppositions of classical physics, had determined a new experience, a new physics.
Even though a discipline such as physics is historically constrained by practices, practices which pertain to a certain epoch, we should never forget the origin and development which have pictured this discipline. Physics, like occidental culture, was born in Greece. At the beginning of the VI century B.C. in Miletus, mythical and theological explanation changed into rational reflection about Nature. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes started a systematical investigation, a historía, of which they presented a theõria of the origin of the world, its composition, its order. The first philosophers were called physicists as they related themselves to physis; they placed the fundament of existence outside the laws of the city. In opposition to the Sophists, who believed that man was the measure of all things, physicists placed the fundament of existence in Nature, in universal laws which governed the cosmos, independently of the wishes and desires of the Gods [54] . Philosophers distinguished between doxa, mere opinion, and episteme, true knowledge, also translated as science. 1 Physics is concerned with the question of understanding Nature. The questions which guide this search have both an ontological and epistemological character. Physics is not just a discourse about Nature, but rather a discipline which tries to express Nature. A physicist, we believe, is someone who admires the world and wonders about its possibilities and impossibilities, its structure and meaning. To understand in physics means to have a picture of the mathematical formalism which expresses Nature, a map between the mathematical scheme and the concepts which explain a certain experience. However, the known reflection of Einstein to his friend Besso regarding light quanta: "Nowadays every Tom, Dick and Harry thinks he knows it [the answer to the question: 'What are light quanta?'], but he is mistaken." is applicable to quantum mechanics itself. We do not know what quantum mechanics is talking about.
Until we do not answer this ontological question we won't be able to say we have understood quantum mechanics.
In this paper we would like to present the complementary descriptions approach as already discussed in [43] and [44] . We consider this approach a development as well as an extension of our reading of Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli and Werner Heisenberg, a general framework and a philosophical worldview in which we attempt to understand some of the interpretational problems present in modern physics. The complementary descriptions approach takes into account the different conceptual schemes needed to account for the paradoxes which hunt the quantum formalism; it also stresses the need of bringing into stage new concepts, which can expose in a new light the seemingly weird character of quantum mechanics.
The Complementary Descriptions Approach
In [43] we developed the concept of complementarity in order to take into account not only complementary contexts ("phenomena" in Bohr's terminology) but also complementary descriptions such as the classical description, which stresses the reductionistic character of the being, and the quantum description, which stresses the holistic character of the being.
2 For this purpose we will follow a middle path between ontology, i.e. a certain form of the being; and epistemology, i.e. the theoretic preconditions of the description which determine a certain access to the being. Ontology is an expression of the being, it is not the being itself but its expression, thus, always of a specific form, a restricted mode of the being. The main idea is to take into account the distinction of different complementary descriptions which refer to one and the same reality. Different conceptual schemes (descriptions) define different ontologies through their relation to experimental observation. The being arises from the difference between descriptions, just as the one expresses itself through the many.
3 Within the position taken by the complementary descriptions approach different descriptions are able to create different experiences. We want to stress the importance of knowing from which description one is talking from, because it might happen that the same sentence can have only significance in a certain description while it is meaningless in a different one ( [41] , section 9.3). We will argue that only together, different complementary descriptions allow a resolution of the paradoxes which hunt the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Descriptions, Perspectives, Contexts and Properties
We would like now to give some definitions already stated in [43, 44] in order to go further into the discussion. Firstly, descriptions are a general framework in which concepts relate, they express the precondition to access a certain expression of reality. A description is defined by a specific set of concepts, this definition precludes, at a later stage, the possibility of applying incompatible concepts to account for the same phenomena. Quantum mechanics is a description as well as classical mechanics or relativity theory are, each of them relating concepts which are not necessarily compatible with the ones present in a different description.
4 Contrary to N. Bohr's idea, that: "it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual forms" 5 our approach accompanies the line of thought of W. Pauli, who stressed the importance of the development of more general thought-forms:
"If in spite of the logical closure and mathematical elegance of quantum mechanics there is one part of some physicists a certain regressive hope that the epistemological situation we have sketched may turn out not to be final, this is in my opinion due to the strength of traditional thought forms embraced in the designation 'ontology' or 'realism'. Even those physicists who do not reckon themselves entirely as 'sensualists' or 'empiricists' must ask themselves the question, which it is possible to ask on account of the postulational character of these traditional thought-forms, and is unavoidable on account of the existence of quantum mechanics -namely the question whether these thought-forms are necessary condition that physics should be possible at all, or wether other, more general thought-forms can be set up in opposition to them. The analysis of the theoretical foundations of wave or quantum mechanics has shown that the second alternative is the correct one." W. Pauli ([36] , p. 47) In the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics the wave function is expressed by an abstract mathematical form. Its representation can be expressed through the choice of a determined basis B. The non-represented wave function is a perspective. A perspective expresses the potentiality of an action which makes possible the choice of a definite context, it is the condition of possibility for a definite representation to take place; it deals with the choice between mutually incompatible contexts. The perspective cannot be written, it shows itself through the different representations, each of which is a part but not the whole. The importance of defining this level of description is related to the structure of the quantum formalism which, contrary to classical mechanics, is essentially holistic and thus, intrinsically contextual; i.e., it does not allow for the simultaneous existence of mutually incompatible contexts. The context is a definite representation of the perspective, it depends and configures in relation to the concepts which are used in the description. 6 The different possible contexts can not be thought as encompassing a whole of which they are but a part (see [44] , section 1.2).
Let's try to understand these concepts through some examples. In special relativity theory a context is given by a definite inertial frame of reference. However, there is no need of defining the perspective because the invariance principle, given by the Lorentz transformations, allows us to think all these different contexts as existing in actuality, as events which pertain to physical reality. There is a way by which one can relate all the events which actually exist in the same picture (even though their relation is different form that of classical mechanics). In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, a context is given by a definite experimental set up; i.e. a complete set of commuting observables (C.S.C.O.) which is defined equivalently by a quantum wave function in a definite representation/basis. But because of Heisenberg's principle of indetermination there is an intrinsic, ontological incompatibility between different representations. The Kochen Specker theorem [33] , to which we will return later, does not allow to think a property, which is seen from different contexts, as existing in actuality. The different contexts can not be thought in terms of possible views of one and the same "something". In linear classical mechanics and special relativity theory, this problem does not arise because one can relate contexts through the Galilean and Lorentz transformations. One may say that in these theories one can reduce all the different views to a single context, 7 and this is why the idea of perspective becomes superfluous. The formal structure of classical mechanics and relativity theory is reductionistic, and thus, part and whole are equivalent. It is only at the level of the context that one can speak of properties. Different set of properties arise in each representation, which relate and are configured by the logical principles which govern the description. In the case of classical mechanics properties relate via the principles of classical (Aristotelian) logic; i.e. the principle of existence, the principle of identity and the the principle of non-contradiction (see section 4). The reductionistic character of the structure arises from the choice of these ontological principles, which at the same time, allows us to speak of "something" which exists.
8 It is only because one presupposes this structural configuration that one is allowed to speak about entities. In quantum mechanics the properties arising in each context do not follow classical relationships but are determined by a different logic. Heisenberg's principle of indetermination, Bohr's principle of complementarity, Pauli's exclusion principle and the superposition principle provide a structural relationship between quantumproperties which cannot be subsumed into classical thought.
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Different contexts cannot be thought as being faces of a single perspective because the properties which arise in each context can not be thought in classical terms, as existing in actuality. An improper mixture does not allow to think its elements as actual or possible properties. A proper mixture, on the contrary, is "something" which exists in actuality but of which we are uncertain. 10 The procedure of measuring in 6 The distinction between perspective and context was introduced in [41] in order to distinguish between the different modes of existence of the properties in the modal interpretation. Following van Fraassen's distinction between dynamical and value state, we have distinguished between holistic and reductionistic contexts (see also Karakostas 2004 for a similar discussion).
7 Even if we do not know the context we can think in terms of possible contexts, in terms of ignorance. 8 I wish to thank Karin Verelst for the many discussions regarding this subject. 9 For a detailed analysis and discussion of the principles of indetermination, complementarity and superposition as those which determine the fundamental logical structure of quantum theory see [12] and specially [35] . 10 It should be noticed that a proper mixture presupposes the existence of that of which it is talking about, it deals with classical Kolmogorovian probability. As noted by E. Schrödinger (quoted from [11] , p.115): "Probability surely has as its substance a statement as to whether something is or is not the case -an uncertain statement, to be sure. But nevertheless quantum mechanics presupposes an interpretational jump going from an improper mixtures to a proper mixture (something which Bernard D'Espagnat has proved [15] , leads to inconsistencies). The problem is that without this interpretational jump we could not make sense of talking in terms of a classical apparatus. This is the path from a holistic context with quantum holistic properties, with superpositions, into a reductionistic context with classical reductionistic properties and an ignorance interpretation (see [44] , sections 1.3 and 1.4).
When speaking of properties, one must recognize the discourse in which they are embedded. In many discussions regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics one talks about quantum and classical properties just like "properties" without a proper mention to its mode of being, this lack of clarification produces lots of pseudo-problems and misunderstandings which have been discussed earlier (see [44] , section 2).
The perspective has not been acknowledged in quantum mechanics due to the wrong presuppositions which involve the characterization of a quantum state as a vector in Hilbert space. In orthodox quantum mechanics it is assumed that something like a "vector" exists (independently of the basis in which it is "placed"). But in the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics the basis plays an active role, it constitutes the existence of the set of properties which, at a later stage, determines that which will be studied. "This which will be studied", and can be best characterized by an improper mixture, can not be subsumed into the classical categories of an "entity".
11 It is assumed that the Ψ contains all the different representations, that it is in itself an identity, a unity, something which is able to give account of the totality of the different representations [25] . The "same" vector however, cannot support the existence of its different representations, precluding the possibility of thinking of Ψ in terms of something which refers to an entity. As we will show in this paper, it is exactly this idea which cannot be maintained in quantum mechanics.
A brief outline of what we tried to explain until now can be provided in the following scheme: 
Convergence of Descriptions
Complementarity goes with paradox, it allows us to stress the limits of knowledge and, at the same time, it presents us with the incommensurability of reality. Descriptions, perspectives, contexts and concepts are then taken as complementary in this same sense. With the complementary descriptions approach we try to find a middle path between descriptions. The main difficulty of this approach is to stand in between, to not be dragged by any specific description, each of which should be regarded only as a 'partial description', and complementary to a different one.
There is a quite tacit assumption which goes against the ideas we have been presenting, namely, the idea that science is converging towards the ultimate truth, that our knowledge increases with every paper that is published. We think the idea of what is "understanding" has been severely damaged by a radical positivistic attitude science has taken in the last centuries. One should, as a scientist, wonder about the meaning of "understanding".
12 This maybe the core problem for many in reaching the concept of complementarity, which tackles our tacit presuppositions in the traditional positivist epistemological framework; i.e. that a theory provides knowledge about an object if and only if it justifies making it has meaning only if one is indeed convinced that the something in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A probabilistic assertion presupposes the full reality of its subject."
11 Note that one might talk in a reductionistic context as if one would have an entity. If we forget the procedure of successive cuts by which we arrived at a holistic context with improper mixtures we might talk as if this mixture is proper, and thus recover the logical principles which allow us to talk about entities.
12 See for example the very interesting discussion between Heisenberg and Pauli regarding the concept of 'understanding' (chapter 6, [29] ). true descriptive statements predicating properties of some substantial entity [24] . We are interested in what is given in experience, something which should not be confused with what one should expect about experience [25] .
The idea of a convergent reality presupposes the idea that one can reduce concepts of one theory to the next; i.e. that there is a fundamental theory which can reach the fundamental 'concepts of Nature', the theory of everything. Richard Feynman is a proponent of such view, in his BBC television lectures he argued:
"The age in which we live is the age in which we are discovering the fundamental laws of nature, and that day will never come again. It is very exciting, it is marvellous, but this excitement will have to go." R. Feynman (quoted from [40] , p.347).
Reductionism goes together with convergence. In this sense, classical mechanics is worse than relativity theory, because, the last is able to see the concepts of the first as a limit, and at the same time it produces new insights. Contrary to this position, it is quite clear that when one studies the problem in a deeper way, one finds that such concepts are no limits, rather, they can be found as approximations within certain very specific conditions. But, when these conditions are extended to the general frameworks from which the concepts acquire meaning, incompatibilities and inconsistencies appear as much as in between the classical and the quantum description. In other words, trying to find a limit between quantum theory and classical mechanics is to some extent equivalent in trying to find a limit between physics and psychology. Although concepts like space and time can be used in the physical framework as well as in the Freudian theory of psychology, once we generalize the concepts to the complete framework of either description we find out the concepts generalize as well in both directions making impossible to retain the consistency presented in the beginning. Quantum mechanics is full of these type of mistakes which appear in most cases by using concepts and symbols which are not part of the quantum description. 13 Through mixing symbols and concepts which pertain to different descriptions in many cases we end up in weird paradoxes. In order to get closer to the mystery one first needs to demystify and clarify the limits and the correct usage of the different descriptions.
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The idea that quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory of Nature (as describing the fundamental blocks of reality from which everything else can be derived), even the idea that there might exist a true story about the world 15 goes completely against the spirit of what we are proposing here. This idea rests somehow on the presupposition that science has reached (or might be able to reach) the a priori conditions of human understanding itself.
with it." Quantum mechanics presents us a new description, with new concepts which up to the present have not been further developed.
The problem becomes more clear as we continue to analyze the relation between the quantum and the classical description. 16 We should note that, to have a (re)presentation of quantum mechanics does not mean to place it within the classical domain (even though one should explain in what sense a particular experience coincides in the quantum and classical descriptions). The problem is not to (re)present but "to believe" in the (re)presentation, that the (re)presentation is true, that having a representation allows us to see through the veil of Maya. Even today the present approaches to understand quantum mechanics take, explicitly or tacitly, our classical conception of the world as the fundament. They believe in the classical (re)presentation, and thus, try to explain quantum mechanics with classical concepts. They try to find a limit between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.
One should be able to acknowledge the possibility of describing the world from different (incompatible but complementary) view points. Wolfgang Pauli imagined a future in which the quantum conceptions would not be regarded as 'weird.' This conceptual jump, in the way we understand the world, has not yet taken place with respect to quantum mechanics (nor relativity theory 17 ). We believe this is due to the lack of new concepts in the quantum domain and to a 'reductionistic conception' which presupposes that 'understanding' is reducible to 'classical understanding', to a single view point. "When the layman says "reality" he usually thinks that he is speaking about something which is self-evidently known; while to me it appears to be specifically the most important and extremely difficult task of our time to work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality." W. Pauli (quoted from [34] , p.193)
Development of New Concepts
It must be clear at this point that we do not mean to take as a standpoint, like Bohr did, the importance of classical (physical) concepts in the definition of experience. Bohr relied in a concept of complementarity which was a consistent explanation of these phenomena. My approach is a development of the concept of complementarity stressing the importance of descriptions which make possible the preconditions of experimental observation encouraging the creation and development of new concepts within physics.
"In one of his lectures on the development of physics Max Planck said: 'In the history of science a new concept never springs up in complete and final form as in the ancient Greek myth, Pallas Athene sprang up from the head of Zeus.' The history of physics is not only a sequence of experimental discoveries and observations, followed by their mathematical description; it is also a history of concepts. For an understanding of the phenomena the first condition is the introduction of adequate concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can we really know what has been observed." W. Heisenberg ([30] , p.264)
In physics, every new theory that has been developed, from Aristotelian mechanics to general relativity, has been grounded in new systems. The physicist should be a creator of physical concepts. Concepts 16 See for example [44] . 17 See Constantin Piron's reflection on this subject in [39] . 18 The relation between quantum mechanics and classical concepts has been investigated in [44] .
which, within a theory, make possible to grasp certain character of Nature. This, however, should not be regarded as some kind of solipsism, it is not only the description shaping reality but also reality hitting our descriptions. It is through this interaction, namely, our descriptions and the experimental observation that a certain character of the being is expressed. It is in this way that we can develop that which we consider to be reality.
The main difference between quantum mechanics and the rest of the theories created by man is that the quantum wave function expresses explicitly a level in the description of Nature which has been neglected from a mechanistic, entitative idea of a clock-type-world. It presents us with the concept of choice within knowledge itself. This character is expressed in the path from the perspective, which lies in the indeterminate level, to the context, which lies in the determined level. 19 Concepts are lacking in the development of these levels. 20 The problem remains to provide a consistent image (an anschaulich content), of quantum theory. The theory itself forces us to create new concepts which give a proper account of what is quantum mechanics talking about. What does one mean when one talks about a quantum wave function? What does one mean when one talks about a quantum superposition?
3 Paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics: Modality and Contextuality
Quantum mechanics was born from a para-doxa, which even today remains still not completely recognized: the impossibility of thinking about entities through the quantum formalism. as suspect to me as the concepts of "being" metaphysical spaces or "heavens" (be they Christian or Platonic), and "the Supreme" or "Absolute." [footnote: This is an allusion to Indian philosophy.
Even those Indian philosophers who, like Prof. S Radhakrishnan , avoid applying the word "illusion" to the empirical world have no other way of commenting on the Mysterium of the connection between "ultimate reality" and the empirical world, except to call it "Maya"] With all these entities, there is an essential paradox of human cognition (subject-object relation), which is not expressed, but sooner or later, when the authors least expect it, it will come to light!" W. In this section we want to analyze in more detail the constraints which the formalism of quantum mechanics forces to accept, if we are willing to talk about entities. The problem is not how can quantum mechanics be thought in terms of entities, but rather, the problem is to find which are the conditions under which quantum mechanics can be thought.
Modality in Quantum Mechanics
The discussions regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics have not stopped since its birth in the year 1900. A way of thinking about quantum mechanics is in terms of modalities, Max Born interpreted the quantum wave function as expressing the possibility for a certain outcome to take place. In his 1926 article he writes:
"Schrödingers quantum mechanics [therefore] gives quite a definite answer to the question of the effect of the collision; but there is no question of any causal description. One gets no answer to the question, 'what is the state after the collision' but only to the question, 'how probable is a specified outcome of the collision'." M. Born (quoted from [56] , p.57) Also Werner Heisenberg expressed the idea that the wave function was something related to possibility but still not completely clear:
.] the paper of Bohr, Kramers and Slater revealed one essential feature of the correct interpretation of quantum theory. This concept of the probability wave was something entirely new in theoretical physics since Newton. Probability in mathematics or in statistical mechanics means a statement about our degree of knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we do not know the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine the fall of the dice and therefore we say that the probability for throwing a special number is just one in six. The probability wave function of Bohr, Kramers and Slater, however, meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of 'potentia' in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event ant the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality." W. Heisenberg ([28] , p. 42) It is interesting to characterize two main groups of interpretations within the foundational geography of the quantum: the first group presupposes certain ontology and tries to "fit" the formalism into their own metaphysical scheme (MW, Bohmian mechanics, GRW, etc.). The second group does the opposite, namely, it is interested in developing an interpretation which fits the formalism. Modal interpretations pertain to this second group, trying to learn about quantum mechanics, its structure and meaning. In the following section, within the framework of the modal interpretation, we would like to focus on the problem of pasting together a holistic theory, such as quantum mechanics, with a reductionistic theory, such as classical mechanics.
Contemporary modal interpretations have continued the footprints left by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli and Max Born and continued the path on the lines drawn by Bas van Fraassen, Simon Kochen, Dennis Dieks and many others, searching for the different possibilities of interpreting the formalism of the theory. 21 Modal interpretations may be thought to be a study of the constraints under which one is able to talk a consistent classical discourse without contradiction with the quantum formalism. Following the general characterization provided in [21] one might state in general terms that a modal interpretation is best characterized by the following points:
1. One of the most significant features of modal interpretations is that they stay close to the standard formulation. Following van Fraassen's recommendation, one needs to learn from the formal structure of the theory in order to develop an interpretation. This is different from many attempts which presuppose an ontology and then try to fit it into the formalism.
2. Modal interpretations are non-collapse interpretations. The evolution is always given by the Schrödinger equation of motion and the collapse of the wave function is nothing but the path from the possible to the actual, it is not considered a physical process.
3. Modal interpretations ascribe possible properties to quantum systems. The property ascription depends on the states of the systems and applies regardless of whether or not measurements are performed. There is a distinction between the level of possibility and that of actuality which are related through an interpretational rule.
4. Modality is not interpreted in terms of ignorance. There is no ignorance interpretation of the probability distribution assigned to the physical properties. The state of the system determines all there is to know. For modal interpretations there is no such thing as 'hidden variables' from which we could get more information. One can formulate a KS theorem for modalities which expresses the irreducible contextual character of the theory even in the case of enriching its language with a modal operator. 21 See for example [50, 32, 16] .
It is important to stress at this point that in the modal interpretations one determines the set of definite properties without adding anything by hand. Given the complete system and its corresponding Hilbert space, the choice of what is the system under study and what is the apparatus determines the factorization of the complete space that leads to the set of definite properties given by the Schmidt decomposition. In spite of the fact that this cut is (mathematically) not fixed a priori in the formalism, the (physical) choice of the apparatus determines explicitly the context [21] . It is exactly this possibility, of having different incompatible contexts given by the choice of mutually incompatible apparatuses, which in turn determines KS type contradictions within the modal interpretation (see for discussion [41] ; and also [31] , section 6.1).
Contextuality in the Modal Interpretation
As expressed by van Fraassen: "The most striking feature of quantum theory is perhaps its holism: when a system is complex, the state of the parts do not determine what the state of the whole will be."
22
An expression of the holistic structure of the theory is its contextual character which can be understood through the Kochen Specker (KS) theorem [33] . Let's see this more in detail. In quantum mechanics the wave function Ψ is an abstract mathematical form which can be expressed in different representations, each of which is given in the formalism by different basis {B, B ′ , B ′′ , ...}; each basis is conceived here in the context of the modal interpretation, thus, providing the set of properties which are determined. For each representation we obtain respectively {|Ψ B , |Ψ B ′ , |Ψ B ′′ , ...}. 23 We have to choose in which basis we are going to write the wave function (context) just like in classical mechanics we choose a certain reference frame to write our equations of motion. But in quantum mechanics, contrary to classical mechanics, each representation/basis expresses a context which can be, in principle, incompatible to a different context. This is where all the trouble starts: compatibility. However, it is interesting to notice that KS theorem talks about actual values of properties, while quantum mechanics seems to be talking about modalities. The question we have posed, together with Graciela Domenech and Hector Freytes is the following: Does KS theorem have anything to say about possible values of properties? Trying to answer this question a modal Kochen Specker (MKS) theorem was developed which proves that contextuality can not be escaped, even in the case modal propositions are taken into account in the discourse [20] . The MKS theorem can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.2 Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then L admits a global valuation iff for each possibility space there exists a Boolean homomorphism f : ⋄L → 2 that admits a compatible actualization.
In classical mechanics one talks with propositions which refer to actual properties of a system, KS precludes this possibility in quantum mechanics. On the other hand, classical statistical mechanics refers to possible entities through an ignorance interpretation of modality, it is this possibility which is untenable in quantum mechanics because of the MKS theorem. It is not possible to say that one is talking in quantum mechanics about possibility in terms of ignorance. In our terms, KS refers to the valuation of actual properties which pertain to different contexts, while the MKS theorem refers to the valuation of possible properties which pertain to different contexts. The conclusion we believe must be drawn in general terms from the MKS theorem is that the Ψ cannot be thought in terms of possible reductionistic contexts. 22 Quoted from [51] , p.73. 23 More generally one can think in terms of density operators: firstly a ρ without a definite basis, and secondly, {ρ B , ρ B ′ , ρ B ′′ , ...} given by the density operator in each basis {B, B ′ , B ′′ , ...}. 24 For an analysis of the concept of compatibility see for example the very interesting passage of the book of Asher Peres ( [38] , chapter 7.); see also [3] and references therein.
It is the holistic structure of quantum mechanics which is responsible for the incompatibility of contexts; i.e. the impossibility of assigning a compatible family of truth valuations to the projection operators of different contexts, which brings into stage the concept of choice (at least in relation to the entity). If one wants to talk about entities in quantum theory, subjectivity appears as a major problem. In quantum theory the entity exists only because we choose. But this subjective entity is unacceptable in science, which deals with objective statements. In classical mechanics, on the contrary, due to its compatible 25 (reductionistic) structure, one can neglect this level (which we have called earlier "perspective"). Reductionistic theories do not suffer from this "problem" because their structure always allows for a Boolean valuation. Coloring every atom in the universe (every point in phase space) would not arise a problem because the universe is nothing but the sum of these atoms. 26 Classically, the choice of the context discovers (rather than creates) an element of physical reality, which of course was already there... just like the moon is outside there regardless of choice, of us looking at her or not.
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Within the modal interpretation proposed by Gyula Bene and Dennis Dieks [8] we have defined in [41] , the perspective, which describes all the possible (mutually exclusive) contexts. When we choose a definite context we obtain a definite relation between subsystems and the (Boolean) classical structure is almost regained. It is still not completely regained as the contexts remain fundamentally holistic. The properties arising from them are best characterized by an improper mixture, as we have seen through the MKS theorem, it is not possible to interpret the contexts as reductionistic contexts. One still needs to make an "interpretational jump" and forget about the procedure through which one obtained this mixture. Only then one is able to give an ignorance interpretation and talk as if these properties where reductionistic. We then describe everything as if what we had obtained was an proper mixture (which later describes an entity of which we are uncertain).
In the complementary descriptions approach we have argued that these descriptions are mutually objective in the sense just explained and only together give a deeper understanding of the correlations in quantum mechanics. As mentioned earlier we have introduced the concept of context as the definite factorization while the perspective remains as the condition of possibility for this choice to take place ( [41] , section 7.1). These levels are necessary not only as a pedagogical source but as the determination of a new conceptual scheme which in turn produces a new expression of reality. It is through this development that we have analyzed the measurement process in quantum mechanics (see [44] , section 2). The determination of the context is the final "Heisenberg cut" which determines the transition from the perspective level to the context level: The perspective can be factorized in infinitely many ways, each of which determines a definite relation between all the subsystems. A complete set of 'new' contexts appear each time we choose to change the factorization. The perspective cannot be a priori decomposed into elementary blocks, these holistic contexts, and the whole from which they 'become', should be regarded as expressing the essential character of quantum mechanics, that of precluding the possibility of thinking about the quantum wave function in terms of the classical principles of identity, unity and totality.
Green Tables and Boeings 747 in the Modal Interpretation
Property Composition (P C) and Property Decomposition (P D) are common features of our everyday reasoning and intuitions (see [14] , p.385); these properties follow in classical Boolean logic and we take them for granted since first grade school when we are introduced with 'Venn diagrams' and 'set theory'. 28 However, these properties do not follow in every kind of logic, more specifically, they do not follow in quantum (non-Boolean) logic. In this kind of logic, firstly introduced by Birkhoff and J. von Neumann [9] , the Distributive Condition (DC) is not fulfilled. 29 Quantum properties do not follow classical Boolean logic, but a non-distributive logic which corresponds to the algebra of closed subspaces of vector Hilbert space, with 'meet' and 'joint' operations corresponding to 'intersection' and 'direct sum' of subspaces. What one calls "electron" in quantum mechanics does not behave like any kind of entity. The problem is that our language leaves little space for anything which is not an entity, so we have no other choice than to presuppose from the very beginning that an electron is an entity. In close relation to Einstein's idea that separability should be regarded as a presupposition in doing physics, Arntzenius [5, 6] and Clifton [13, 14] have argued that the absence of P C and P D in an interpretation of quantum mechanics (more specifically in the K-D and D-V modal interpretations) makes it metaphysically untenable. Contrary to this idea, we have stressed that one should not take as presuppositions, the conditions under which quantum mechanics can provide a general picture, rather, one should stay close to the quantum formalism and find out what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us. Although these conditions might seem "common sense" conditions, it is exactly this common sense which quantum mechanics seems to go against.
Arntzenius [5] discusses the example of assigning properties to a green table in which Q a represents the property 'greenness' of the left hand side of the table, and Q a I represents the property 'greenness' of the table as a whole. The thing is that these properties Q a and Q a I meet the demands of being different and of being observationally indistinguishable: from the logical point of view Q a represents the proposition 'The left hand side of the table is green' and Q a I represents the proposition 'The table as a whole is green at the left hand side'. 30 These propositions can be analyzed as predicating two different predicates, namely, 'green' and 'green at the left hand side', respectively, to two different individuals, 'the left hand side of the table' and 'the table as a whole', respectively. By means of this example, Arntzenius discusses the failure of P C and argues that the fact that different truth values are assigned to propositions like 'the left hand side of the table is green' and 'the table has a green left side' is bizarre.
Clifton ([14] , section 2.3) developed an example in which the violations of P C and P D seem to show implications which seem at least incompatible with the everyday description of reality. In the example Clifton takes a Boeing 747 which has a possibly wrapped left-hand wing: a is the left-hand wing and a β is the airplane as a whole. For us, the problem remains how to think quantum mechanics consistently. Rather than adding conditions of "common sense" we should wonder about how to understand the conditions which quantum mechanics already respects. We cannot expect that fundamentally new theories (like we think is the case of quantum mechanics) respect the logical principles of classical physics; this would be tantamount to demand that classical physics should determine the conceptual tools of new theories. As noted by Dieks, this would deny the possibility of really new fundamental theories, conceptually independent of classical physics. Riemann geometry goes against "common sense", in this geometry the idea that two parallels do not intersect is left aside. Earlier mathematicians were looking for an ad absurdum demonstration of the impossibility to leave the fifth Euclidean axiom. Riemann built a new geometrical system as consistent as its predecessor, however, no one would say today that Non-Euclidean geometry is "nonsense", least of all physicists, whom have used this geometry to develop relativity theory, one of the most important theories created in the last century. Analogously, we believe that a deeper understanding of the logic inherent to quantum mechanics can help us in providing an image of the theory.
Our answer is straightforward, an airplane is a classical concept in itself which presupposes from the very beginning our classical conception of the world. The tacit idea surrounding this discussion is reductionism. Quantum mechanics should not necessarily be regarded as a theory which refers to airplanes, or in other words, there is no need that every theory is mapped into classical physics. The 747 will have reductionistic properties, the mechanic and the pilot must agree, simply because they are talking about an airplane which presupposes a classical description. It is only the theory which can tell you what can be measured, and the presuppositions for the existence of an airplane lie within the walls of classicality. The mistake is to believe that an airplane is something which exists independently of the description. An airplane is an expression of classical physics and thus, follows its logic. Quantum mechanics can not be applied to an airplane, this is in no way different from the fact that quantum mechanics leads to inconsistencies when being applied to a classical apparatus. Everything that we have learned until today points directly to the idea that quantum mechanics cannot be subsumed into classical thought.
Ontological Potentiality in the Modal Interpretation
The meaning of possibility has been a matter of debate within the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bacciagaluppi has stated the following: "I would claim that, despite the name, the modal interpretation in the version of Vermaas and Dieks is a theory about actualities -albeit a stochastic one." Van Fraasen, even though distinguishes between a dynamical state and a value state, takes modalities to be only semantical. Regarding van Fraassen: There is only one actual reality. Modalities are in our theories, not in the world. Contrary to these views, within the complementary descriptions framework we regard the quantum description as describing the possible from an equal ontological standpoint to the classical description. In this sense the formalism of quantum mechanics, and therefore a superposition state reflects a character of reality just in the same way a Stern-Gerlach apparatus does; as discussed in section 2.3 there is no actuality voided of description as theoretical presuppositions. It is important to notice that modal interpretations, as they stand, do not talk about Schrödinger cats, superpositions, as ontologically existent entities, they only talk about actual cats (!) We wish to stand for the opposite: Modalities are in the world, not only in our theories, they express a complementary description of reality. This determines an empirical distinction between our modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and those which regard superpositions as void of an ontological status (see [44] , section 1.4).
Through the complementary descriptions approach we have presented earlier the idea that the problem posed by Vermaas:
"There does not exist a super modal interpretation which integrates the holistic and reductionistic features of the bi (K-D), spectral (D-V) and atomic modal interpretations. Instead one has to choose and settle for either a holistic or reductionistic interpretation" P. Vermaas ([53] , p.233)
can be solved by taking into account both, holistic and reductionistic descriptions [41, 42, 43, 44] . The holistic context talks about the potential in an ontological stance, as something which cannot be reduced to the actual; while the reductionistic context talks about the possible as related to the actual.
We believe that the impossibility of solving this problem appears from regarding the actual as the real. Thinking the potential is merely the possible, that it can be reducible to actuality. The idea of regarding actuality as the real is a heavy burden in western though which comes already from Aristotelian philosophy and its cosmology. Even though Aristotle understood the problem of movement, and created the concept of potential being his choice of grounding existence on the immobile motor, pure acto, determined the path of philosophy on the lines of actuality (as opposed to potentiality).
"Aristotle [...] created the important concept of potential being and applied it to hyle. [...] This is where an important differentiation in scientific thinking came in. Aristotle's further statements on matter cannot really be applied in physics, and it seems to me that much of the confusion in Aristotle steams from the fact that being by far the less able thinker, he was completely overwhelmed by Plato.
He was not able to fully carry out his intention to grasp the potential, and his endeavors became bogged down in early stages." W. Pauli ([37] , p.93)
The problem which we recover from Pauli and Heisenberg is this: how is it possible to think in terms of potentiality? Aristotle distinguishes between two types of potentiality. Firstly, generic potentiality: the potentiality of a seed that can transform into a tree; this generical sense is not that which interests Aristotle but rather the second possibility, the potentiality as a mode of existence: the poet has the capacity of writing poems but also of not writing poems. It is not only the potentiality of doing this or that, but also the potentiality of not-doing, potentiality of not being, of not passing to the actual. What is potential is capable of being and not being. This is the problem of potentiality: the problem of possessing a faculty. What do I mean when I say "I can", "I cannot". Ontological potentiality is a mode of existence which expresses power to do, pure action. 31 In order to develop the quantum description we have introduced the concept of ontological potentiality which presents us with, as Aristotle expressed, a different form of the being. The central point of the concept of ontological potentiality is that it cannot be reduced to actuality and presents us with a different form of the being, i.e. the necessity of considering potentiality as ontologically independent of actuality. I think that in order to reach a deep understanding of the quantum theory it is necessary to go further and develop this concept which allows us to think quantum mechanics in a new fresh way. Wolfgang Pauli had foreseen this path and pointed directly to it:
"Science today has now, I believe, arrived at a stage were it can proceed (albeit in a way as yet not at all clear) along the path laid down by Aristotle. The complementarity characteristics of the electron (and the atom) (wave and particle) are in fact "potential being," but one of them is always "actual nonbeing." That is why one can say that science, being no longer classical, is for the first time a genuine theory of becoming and no longer Platonic." W. Pauli ([37] , p.93)
Entities and Faculties in Quantum Mechanics
Going back to the VI century B.C. we can see that the seed of occidental physics was already present in the problem of movement. As the discussion has come to our days, specially through the reading of Plato and Aristotle, 32 the pre-Socratic thought had approached this problem from two, seemingly opposed positions. Hercalitus of Elea, stated the theory of flux, a doctrine of permanent motion and unstability in the world. The consequences of this doctrine are, as both Plato and Aristotle stressed repeatedly, the impossibility to develop stable, certain knowledge about the world, for an object, changing each instant, does not allow for even to be named with certainty, let alone to be 'known', i.e., assigned fixed, objective characteristics. Parmenides was placed at the opposite side, teaching the non-existence of motion and change in reality, reality being absolutely One, and being absolutely Being [52] . Aristotle's solution to the problem of movement soon became the guiding line of physics. It was this solution which determined the fate of western thought. The idea of Aristotle was to postulate the existence of essential properties which 31 Earlier [42] we have used the ideas of Agamben ([4] , p.183) in order to read Aristotle: "What is essential is that potentiality is not simply non-Being, simple privation, but rather the existence of non Being, the presence of an absence; this is what we call a 'faculty' or 'power.' 'To have a faculty' means to have a privation. And potentiality is not a logical hypostasis but the mode of existence of this privation. But how can an absence be present, how can a sensation exist as anesthesia? This is the problem that interests Aristotle." We would like now to take distance from the negative part of this interpretation as we consider that ontological potentiality should be thought in terms of power to do, pure affirmation (see also [26] ). 32 One could state following K. Verelst [52] that: "the 'contradiction' seen by classical philosophy between Heraclitus and Parmenides is not necessarily a correct understanding of the earlier 'philosophies'. One could as well infer that Heraclitus and Parmenides do articulate the same world-experience, the former as the experience of reality over a lapse of time, the latter as the experience of the absolute reality of this moment." determined the essence of that which existed. An entity is thus, something which has a distinct, separate existence, a collection of characters which can be placed as a unity, an identity, a totality. Stability of the being was placed in the entity, becoming was lost. Following Verelst and Coecke: In order to point directly to the idea of entity we must recognize its fundament in the principles of classical (Aristotelian) logic: the existence of objects of knowledge, the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity which are exemplified in the three possible usages of the verb "to be": existential, predicative, and identical.
"The Aristotelian syllogism always starts with the affirmation of existence: something is. The principle of contradiction then concerns the way one can speak (predicate) validly about this existing object, i.e., about the truth and falsehood of its having properties, not about its being in existence. The principle of identity states that the entity is identical to itself at any moment (a=a), thus granting the stability necessary to name (identify) it. It will be clear that the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity are closely interconnected. In any way, change and motion are intrinsically not provided for in this framework; therefore the ontology underlying the logical system of knowledge is essentially static, and requires the introduction of a First Mover with a proper ontological status beyond the phenomena for whose change and motion he must account." K. Verelst and B. Coecke ( [52] , p.172, emphasis added)
It is the idea of entity which generated the development of physics since Aristotle. This is why we might say today that the history of classical physics is the history of physical entities: particles, waves, fields, etc. Even though we recognize its importance in occidental thought, we believe that the idea of entity appears, in the context of quantum mechanics as, what Gaston de Bachelard [7] calls, an "epistemological obstruction"; i.e. an idea which restricts our possibilities to imagine the physics provided by quantum mechanics.
This conception of Nature was taken to its lasts consequences in the modern period which started in the XVII century. Nature itself had become an entity which needed to be studied, "cutted into pieces". The Baconian principle of disectum naturae became the methodological weapon of modern times. As noted by Heisenberg these ideas were a direct consequence of the reading of the Cartesian partition as a cut between "res cogitans" and "res extensa".
"If one uses the fundamental concepts of Descartes at all, it is essential that God is in the world and in the I and it is also essential that the I cannot be really separated from the world. Of course Descartes knew the undisputable necessity of the connection, but philosophy and natural science in the following period developed on the basis of the polarity between the 'res cogitans' and the 'res extensa'. The influence of the Cartesian division on human thought in the following centuries can hardly be overestimated, but it is just this division which we have to criticize later from the development of physics in our time.
[...] Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have thought, but it makes the sharp separation between the world and the I impossible.
If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian partition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the human mind during the three centuries following Descartes and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.
The position to which the Cartesian partition has led with respect to the 'res extensa' was what one may call metaphysical realism. The world, i.e. the extended things, 'exist'. [...] Dogmatic realism claims that there are no statements concerning the material world that cannot be objectivated. [...] When Einstein has criticized quantum theory he has done so from the basis of dogmatic realism. This is a very natural attitude. Every scientist who does research work feels that he is looking for something that is objectively true. His statements are not meant to depend upon the conditions under which they can be verified. Especially in physics the fact that we can explain nature by simple mathematical laws tells us that here we have met some genuine feature of reality, not something which we have-in any menaing of the world-invented ourselves. This is the situation which Einstein had in mind when he took dogmatic realism as the basis for natural science. But quantum theory is in itself an example for the possibility of explaining nature by means of simple mathematical laws without this basis." W. Heisenberg ([28] , p.73)
However, though we see the critics of Heisenberg as touching an important point, we also believe that Albert Einstein clearly understood the radicalness of the quantum revolution regarding the problem of physical reality. If one takes seriously the formalism of quantum mechanics the conclusion that must be drawn is that entities are some kind of subjective elements of physical reality. The ontological concern which he repeatedly posed to Born, Heisenberg, Pauli and specially to Bohr, did not find an adequate answer. His concern, which is nowadays commonly charicaturized, was absolutely justified. The truth is that in quantum mechanics it is not possible to state that Ψ refers to some kind of entity which exist independently of our choice (see [31] for a detailed discussion). The quantum wave function Ψ is a non-represented element in which mutually incompatible representations co-exist. In order to solve the paradox we claim that quantum mechanics does not talk about entities. It might be thus regarded as the first physical theory which does not refer objectively to some kind of entity (particles, waves, fields, etc.). Quantum mechanics talks about faculties in an objective way [45] . The ontological problem of understanding the meaning of the quantum wave function can be only solved if we are able to create a new way of relating to Nature. A way which does not avoid recognizing the limitations of the classical view of the world.
We have introduced in [43, 44] the concept of faculty, in order to give account of that of which quantum mechanics is talking about. The mode of being of a faculty is potentiality, not thought in terms of possibility (which relies on actuality) but rather in terms of what we have called ontological potentiality: something which is and is not, here and now. A faculty is determined by a certain state of affairs, and in this sense it is from the very start a contextual concept. I have the faculty of raising my hand, which does not mean that "I will raise my hand" or "I will not raise my hand"; what it means is that here and now I possess a faculty which exists in the mode of being of potentiality, independent of what will happen in actuality. A faculty is determined always by a certain state of affairs. I possess the faculties of running and swimming, but in order for these faculties to exists, I must be either in a place where either I can run or I can swim. I can say: "I can swim (here and now)" only if I am in a place where I can swim, like for example in a swimmingpool. This has nothing to do with the fact that in the near future I choose either to swim or not to swim while I'm in the swimmingpool. In a swimmingpool however, I am not able to run, just in the same way that I am not able to swim in the street. In our earlier terms the context determines the existence of the faculty explicitly, faculties are contextual existents. We can also see from this example tat incompatibility is a central feature of faculties. Our strong claim is that faculties do exist in quantum physics just like entities exist in the realm of classical physics. An entity is governed by the logical principles of classical logic (principle of existence, principle of non-contradiction and principle of identity) but a faculty is governed by completely different principles, namely, Heisenberg's principle of indetermination, Bohr's principle of complementarity and the superposition principle.
We are now in conditions to complete our schematic approximation: 
Discussion
According to the received view our language presupposes individuality, it is an expression of the metaphysical choice inherited from Aristotle, Plato and the Parmenidean 'One'. These presuppositions expressed by classical logic go together with classical mechanics. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is closer to the Heraclitean 'Many'. 33 Classical and quantum mechanics are different expressions of Nature. Both theories approach reality, the result of which is to a large extent determined by the description itself: they are mutually incompatible, and at the same time they are expressions of the preconceptions involved presenting complementary views of reality. It is in this general sense that I have expressed the idea that the quantum mechanical description can be regarded as complementary to the classical description.
As expressed by Folse ([24] , p.163): "Bohr persistently evades any direct engagement with the question of 'reality'." This is why, in this specific sense, we are closer to Einstein's concern about ontology. Physics deals with the questions about what there is and not only about what we can merely say. Off course we do not neglect the importance of the linguistic turn, but we do not regard language as being all there is. Physics deals with the problem of reality, but reality should not be a pre-established concept nor a prejudice in observing and relating empirical data, rather it should remain a goal concept which should be transformed and developed. We should not expect reality to be... as we would like it to be; we must constantly revise the conceptual framework with which such a description is expressed. Following the main idea, which led Einstein to the special theory of relativity, we should not conclude experiments from reality; however, the opposite should be neither pursued. Carlo Rovelli ([46] , p.2) proposed the following: "I have a methodological suggestion for the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics: Finding the set of physical facts from which the quantum mechanics's formalism can be derived." The problem is: there are no facts without a description. As Einstein himself pointed out to Heisenberg: "It is only the theory which decides what can be observed." Experimental observation and description are intricately related without supremacy of one over the other, both being the reflection of the former like two mirrors with nothing in between.
My standpoint is that experience is defined by description, and vice versa, description is defined by experience, they intricate themselves with no preponderance of the one over the other. In order to regain objectivity, we must acknowledge that the classical description has no supremacy over different descriptions, that it is not given to us a priori, and that it develops through the different descriptions with which we choose to express ourselves. The phrase of Bohr (quoted from [56] , p.7) stating that "the unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of the classical physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physics for all time." gives way to a quite strong conclusion, this is, that we have come to the limits in the pre-conditions of human understanding. By having to confront Einstein's realism and ontological position Bohr was dragged to the other extreme, namely, a purely epistemological position. We hope to go back to the middle path, just in between experience and description, between creation and discovery. 34 We claim that the distinction between perspective and context in order to describe the quantum measurement problem and the path from the potential to the actual (see [44] , section 1) is central in 33 See for example David Finkelstein's paper: "All is Flux" for a related analysis [23] . 34 A related position, namely, the creation discovery view was introduced by Aerts in [2] .
order to understand the path from the quantum description to the classical description and vice versa. Our interpretation brings into stage a new reading of how to understand modality in quantum mechanics. In this sense, with our concept of ontological potentiality, we take distance from earlier conceptions of potentiality in terms of becoming actual (which is the first distinction of Aristotle) such as those proposed by Heisenberg, Piron, Popper, Margenau and more recently by Aerts and Suárez (see also [31, 48] for further discussions on the subject). This concepts use only the first type of potentiality which is that which needs actuality as a presupposition. Potentiality should be understood as a mode of the being, but in order to escape its interpretation in terms of actuality the idea of faculty becomes fundamental. Finally, our approach discusses the concept of faculty as expressing that of which quantum mechanics is talking about. The articulation of faculties within the scope of quantum mechanics will be discussed in more detail in [45] .
As Pauli stated, we must confront the most important problem of our time, which is the problem of developing a new idea of reality. Only through a new idea of reality is that we will be able to take into account the new experience to which quantum mechanics confronts us. Only through this development is that we can think a fresh new experiments which can lead to new discoveries. Only through these developments is that we can learn to understand quantum mechanics.
